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SYMPOSIUM
The Next Pandemic: Anticipating an
Overwhelmed Health Care System
Mary Grace Keating Duley
Operations Branch, Office of Public Health Preparedness, Connecticut Department of
Public Health, Hartford, Connecticut
Introduction: In September 2005, an overview of current health care system planning
efforts was presented to the audience at the Yale University Ethics Symposium on Avian
and Pandemic Influenza. The speaker, also the author of this article, provided the audience
with a summary of what was being undertaken with the use of federal preparedness funds
to improve the overall infrastructure of the health care system.
All of Connecticut’s 31 acute care hospitals, the Veteran’s Administration Hospital in West
Haven, Hospital for Special Care, Gaylord Rehabilitation Hospital, Natchaug Psychiatric
Hospital, and the state’s 13 Community Health Centers are currently recipients of federal
preparedness funds. Federal funding for this planning comes from Health Resources and
Services Administration, Department of Health and Human Service’s National Bioterrorism
Hospital Preparedness Program.
Objectives: This article outlines the planning activities around pandemic influenza that the
state’s health care system partners started in 2004-05 and also those they are currently
participating in or will be participating in the next 12 to 15 months. The article highlights the
key objectives and strategies that health care facilities will be using in this planning. There
are four major objectives that each health care facility’s Emergency Operations Plan must
address. They are: increasing bed availability, developing strategies to deal with the poten-
tial staffing shortages, developing strategies for dealing with potential critical equipment
and pharmaceutical shortages, and, lastly, the implementation of education, training, and
communication strategies for their health care workers and the public they serve. These
plans, and all the activities needed to operationalize the plans, such as education, training,
drills, and exercises, will include their key partners, i.e., local health departments, local
emergency management, police, fire, and Emergency Medical Services. This article will
describe this work plan in detail.
Methods: Descriptive information was obtained through the author’s observations and per-
sonal experiences, in addition to governmental guidance, reports, and plans.
Conclusion: The “all-hazards” planning currently being undertaken by the key health care
system partners in Connecticut as a result of federal funding for preparedness post 9/11
has fostered great working relationships between these entities and their local, regional,
and statewide planning counterparts. Many of the specific grant dollars being provided to
these facilities can assist in the planning that must be done for pandemic flu.OVERVIEW OF CURRENT
HEALTH CARE PLANNING
EFFORTS IN CONNECTICUT
Since 2002, all states and United
States territories have been recipients of
National Bioterrorism Hospital
Preparedness Program (NBHPP)† grants
offered by the Department of Health and
Human Service’s (DHHS) Health
Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA). The mission of the NBHPP is to
ready hospitals and supporting health care
systems to deliver coordinated and effec-
tive care to victims of terrorism and other
public health emergencies [1]. Currently,
the state’s 31 acute care hospitals, the
Veteran’s Administration Hospital in West
Haven, the Hospital for Special Care,
Gaylord Hospital, Natchaug Psychiatric
Hospital, and the 13 Community Health
Centers (CHCs) are recipients of these
federal preparedness funds to improve the
overall infrastructure of the state’s health
care system. The funding that these facili-
ties receive was, in 2005-06, based on the
six HRSA NBHPP Priority Groups:
Priority Area No. 2 Surge Capacity
Planning, Priority Area No. 5 Education
and Training, and Priority Area No. 6
Drills and Exercises. The area of surge
capacity planning is quite broad and
includes nine benchmarks that the federal
government wants the state to meet. These
benchmarks are: Surge Capacity — Beds;
Surge Capacity — Isolation Capacity;
Surge Capacity — Emergency System for
Advance Registration of Volunteer Health
Professionals (Personnel); Surge Capacity
— Pharmaceutical Caches; Surge Capa-
city — Personal Protective Equipment;
Surge Capacity — Decontamination;
Surge Capacity — Behavioral Health;
Surge Capacity —Trauma and Burn Care;
and Surge Capacity — Communications
and Information Technology [2]. In this
upcoming grant cycle, FY 2006-07, the
health care system will need to build on
the capacity it developed in the first four
years of the program and now move
toward capability based planning and
specifically around four scenarios, one of
which is pandemic influenza. In addition
to the HRSANBHPPdollars, the states are
also receiving funds from the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC), an organization
within the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS), for pandemic
influenza planning. These monies are
being released to states in phases. The dol-
lars each hospital and CHC currently
receives for preparedness planning and
will be receiving this coming year from
both HRSA and CDC will assist them in
their pandemic influenza planning efforts.
Many of the items needed for surge capac-
ity in a pandemic also could be used to
protect the facilities from a multitude of
other natural or man-made disasters.
HRSA NBHPP
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING
The FY 2005-06 NBHPP Guidance
gave the states specific directives on what
needed to be done in order to prepare for an
influenzapandemic[2].Theguidancedirect-
ed them to establish systems that at a mini-
mum could provide triage, treatment, and
initial stabilization above their daily staffed
bed capacity. The state of Connecticut, with
an approximate population of 3.4 million
people, would need to increase its capacity
and capability to handle an additional 1,750
patients with influenza [2].
This guidance also addressed the fact
that a pandemic would place a substantial
burden on both inpatient and outpatient
health care services and cause an
increased demand for health services,
while at the same time, there would be an
increase in illness and absenteeism among
the health care worker population. In addi-
tion to a shortage of hospital beds and per-
sonnel needed to care for patients, equip-
ment such as ventilators and infection con-
trol supplies, and possibly antibiotics, also
would most likely be in short supply.
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it is essential that the health care system
develop strategies and plans to effective-
ly deal with them. All of the hospitals
and CHCs have been informed that
detailed information concerning the
development of influenza pandemic pre-
paredness plans can be found at
www.pandemicflu.gov/plan
When the Department of Public
Health (DPH) receives updated informa-
tion from the DHHS or CDC, the informa-
tion is immediately forwarded to the con-
tacts in the health care facilities that over-
see the planning efforts taking place in that
particular institution. Some of the other
planning resources made available to these
planners include the Canadian Pandemic
Flu Plan, Flu Aid, Flu Surge, CDC
Education and Training Aids, and the
World Health Organization Pandemic
Influenza Plan, just to name a few. The
recently released National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza can be found at
www.pandemicflu.gov. This is also an
effective planning tool. In addition to the
above-mentioned information being pro-
vided to assist in planning, the state’s two
Centers of Excellence [3] have developed
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Strategies that they are sharing among all
the hospitals and the CHCs. Their strategy
documents both complement and integrate
with the National Strategy and the HHS
Pandemic Influenza Plan.
In addition to utilizing the above-
mentioned references, DPH worked with
the Yale-New Haven Health System
(YNHHS) Center of Excellence (CoE) and
drafted a Pandemic Influenza Hospital
Preparedness Checklist [4], and our CHC
planner adapted the hospital checklist for
the CHCs [5]. The checklist was sent out
to the facilities in March with a request
that they be completed and returned to
DPH. The gaps present in their checklists
will be the basis of our work in the coming
year as we move ahead with pandemic flu
planning.
MAJOR OBJECTIVES FOR
HEALTH CARE FACILITY
PREPAREDNESS
As we enter the annual influenza epi-
demic season each November, it is a great
time for facilities to review their current
policies for influenza vaccination of their
staff and patients. It is noted in the HRSA
Guidance that the annual vaccination of
health care workers actually has several
beneficial effects in the long-term. The
increasing of vaccination during an inter-
pandemic period potentially could
increase vaccine acceptance at the time of
a pandemic, and this increased demand
may lead the vaccine manufacturers to
increase supply and production capacity,
which will enhance our preparedness
efforts.
Based on the HRSA NBHPP
Guidance, the National Strategy, and the
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, there are
four major objectives each state must
undertake to assure health care facility
preparedness: (1) Develop strategies to
maximize staffed beds; (2) Develop strate-
gies to cope with the potential staffing
shortages; (3) Develop strategies to deal
with potential critical equipment short-
ages; and (4) Implement education, train-
ing, and communication strategies for
health care workers and the public.
STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING
BED AVAILABILITY
It is essential for the hospitals to
develop strategies to increase bed avail-
ability, in addition to maximizing those
staffed beds. The hospitals would imple-
ment more stringent triage and decrease
length of hospital stay. There also would
be an attempt to decrease other types of
admissions if possible. This can be done in
a variety of ways, such as the development
of guidelines and contingency plans to
limit elective admissions and surgeries.
Admission criteria should be reviewed and
revised as necessary. There also needs to
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Home Health Agencies and the Visiting
Nurses Association for those patients who
will have to get an early release to make
room for the very sickest patients. Health
care facilities need to expand their focus
on managing patient flow.
Eventually, the hospital will reach its
capacity limit, and the use of alternative
care sites will have to be considered.
Ideally, these locations could care for large
numbers of less critically ill patients, so in
essence the hospitals will be treating only
the most ill patients. The HRSA NBHPP
Guidance for FY 2006-07 mandates states
identify alternate sites of care. All states
must have the ability to provide surge
capacity outside of the hospital setting as
has been demonstrated through recent
public health emergencies. These alternate
care sites (ACSs) should be within a cer-
tain radius of health care facilities. An
important concept for states to keep in
mind is that while selecting these sites,
planning must consider that federal assets
exist that can be brought to bear but
require an “environment of opportunity”
for set-up and operation and may not be
available for 72 hours. This year, the fol-
lowing information has to be reported to
the federal government concerning these
sites: How many sites have been identified
at the state and sub-state regional level?
What types of facilities are being consid-
ered?What can the facilities accommodate
in terms of the numbers of patients and
level of care (i.e., triage, basic care and
stabilization, trauma level-type care,
patients transferred from hospitals, med-
ical-needs shelters, etc.)?
What staffing plans have been devel-
oped for these facilities? What are the
plans for supply and re-supply of the facil-
ities? What are the plans for the security of
the site? What are the plans for patient
movement to the sites and from the sites to
more definitive care sites either within or
outside of the state? [6] The establishment
of these non-traditional settings to provide
health care will require advanced planning
in order to succeed. In Connecticut, both
the health care facilities and DPH have
come to the conclusion that this is a viable
option. Now the work is beginning
between the state DPH, local health
departments, and the hospitals, with their
other regional planning partners, to incor-
porate this option into their pandemic
influenza preparedness and response
plans. The ACS selection tool that was
developed by AHRQ in 2004 will be uti-
lized to determine these sites. This tool has
been provided to all hospitals, local health
departments, and the regional Department
of Emergency Management and Home-
land Security (DEMHS) planners for use
at the monthly planning meetings and
when visits are made to various sites to
determine their viability as an ACS. All
plans will need to identify a trigger that
would cause the activation of these care
sites. There are five DEMHS-designated
planning regions. All the health care sys-
tem partners, along with the local tradi-
tional response partners, will be working
on the identification of these sites over the
next six to 12 months. Another important
item to consider in this planning is to real-
ize that non-traditional site staffing is not
traditionally provided by the local hospi-
tals, as they will most likely be over-
whelmed. How they would be staffed, and
by whom, is an essential part of the plan-
ning that must take place well in advance
of a pandemic. Connecticut is currently
considering that some hospital personnel
will staff these sites in a supervisory
capacity and volunteers from our
Statewide Emergency Credentialing
Program would provide the primary staff
positions.
In late June 2006 at the New England
States and New York State Pandemic
Influenza Planning Meeting in Boston, the
following objectives were determined
concerning ACSs. The states sought to
define levels of care atACSs and to define
the locations for these sites. An agreement
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eating that the administrative authority for
the ACS will derive from the institution
that has responsibility for the operation.
There is also agreement by the seven states
on goals for surge capacity. First, the states
seek to provide access to care for large
numbers of patients. Secondly, the states
will move to protect critical health care
sectors by maintaining access to hospital-
level care for non-flu patients. Thirdly,
they will ensure surge management and
basic cohorting of flu and non-flu patients.
Fourth, hospitalization of non-flu patients
will be minimized to the extent possible
using standard triage protocols. Fifth,
standards will be established to decrease
mortality, transmission of the virus, and
ameliorate suffering through treatment at
ACSs, outpatient, home, and hospital care
sites. Sixth, all elective inpatient and out-
patient procedures will be suspended. All
states have agreed that the sickest patients,
including all ICU type patients and those
requiring mechanical ventilation, should
be admitted to acute care hospitals. The
ACS patients would vary according to the
scenario. In the event of a diagnosis of
pandemic flu, only supportive flu care will
be provided. In the ACS, there may be
oxygen but there will not be ventilators.
For the non-pandemic flu patients, those
demonstrating the lowest severity (i.e.,
orthopaedic patients, post op, etc.) will be
moved into ACS to free up capacity in
acute care hospitals. There is a need to
delineate separate levels of care for special
populations. The states have agreed to
identify and share contact information on
these designated groups through a desig-
nated special population coordinator from
each state [7].
STRATEGIES FOR STAFFING
SHORTAGES
An influenza pandemic will place a
substantial burden on inpatient and outpa-
tient health care services. Illness and
absenteeism among health care workers in
the context of the increased demand for
services will further strain the ability of the
health care system to provide quality care
[8]. Health care professionals will be an
indispensable resource in caring for pan-
demic victims. A strong stable health care
infrastructure could do much to blunt the
medical and economic toll of an influenza
pandemic [9]. The pandemic flu scenario
could potentially cause a problem with
personnel, since 40 percent of the health
care and response work force may be
affected, so Connecticut is currently in the
process of another vigorous campaign to
recruit more licensed volunteers, specifi-
cally to assist in a pandemic, whether it be
staffing atACSs and/or staffing the mobile
field hospital, in addition to providing
health care surge capacity to the state’s 32
acute-care hospitals.
Much has been written in the various
federal strategies and plans about creative
ways to deal with the potential critical
staffing shortages that will most likely
result. In order for a health care facility to
survive the pandemic, innovative strate-
gies may have to be undertaken. Many
plans and articles on the pandemic written
by nationally known figures suggest some
of the following strategies: Consider using
health care workers with mild respiratory
illness to provide care to cohorted influen-
za patients. Some health care workers may
simply stay home because they wish to
care for sick family members or have child
care issues. Health care facilities may
want to consider opening up or expanding
hospital-sponsored sick care services for
staff member’s children or elderly family
members as a means of getting the health
care provider to work. Some have suggest-
ed the use of the immune survivors of an
earlier pandemic wave, particularly health
care workers, to become the primary
response corps. It is felt this potentially
could be considered if the pandemic was
moving slowly enough [10]. Health care
facilities also might want to consider, as
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ing health care worker responsibility,
using normally non-clinical staff in clini-
cal roles; expanding the use and activities
of students; and even bringing in retired
health care workers who are interested and
able to assist. Some of the hospitals cur-
rently are working on developing just-in-
time educational information for family
members of flu patients so they can assist
hospital staff in some less critical aspects
of the patient’s care. This will greatly
assist the staff, who may be overburdened
with more than the usual patient load
because of staff absenteeism due to illness
or ill family members.
STRATEGIES FOR CRITICAL
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY
SHORTAGES
Many questions arise when the hospi-
tals consider what supplies to consider
stockpiling and how much should be
stockpiled. The HRSA NBHPP Guidance
and the National Strategy both provide
suggestions on what facilities should con-
sider stockpiling. Connecticut hospitals
and CHCs are currently in the process of,
or will begin shortly, establishing stock-
piles of standard infection control supplies
(hand hygiene supplies, gowns, gloves,
and surgical masks). In addition, critical
equipment shortages will most likely be
those used for respiratory care, particular-
ly ventilators, and the associated respirato-
ry equipment needed for a patient requir-
ing mechanical ventilation. Many different
ventilators are on the market, and at the
monthly hospital meetings [11], the hospi-
tals share information on some of the types
they have already ordered or are thinking
of ordering. The DPH Hospital
Preparedness Coordinator has been meet-
ing with the respiratory care directors from
all of the state’s hospitals to determine the
best ventilators to purchase. Consistency
is essential as staffing resources will be in
short supply, and we don’t want 32 differ-
ent hospitals ordering 32 different ventila-
tors. In September 2006, the directors will
come up with recommendations for venti-
lators and respiratory care equipment for
the hospitals to stockpile.Additionally, the
hospital preparedness coordinator makes
every effort to get this key information out
to all the facilities so it can be shared at
internal hospital pandemic influenza plan-
ning meetings. The state DPH is currently
looking into the possibility of establishing
regional stockpiles of standard infection
control supplies and ventilators [2]. The
development of regional stockpiles is
already being done with EMS Mass
Casualty Incident supplies and some of the
Level C and Level B personal protective
equipment for our hospitals. There is also
concern on the part of the federal govern-
ment that there may be a shortage of the
antibiotics needed to treat secondary infec-
tions, so hospitals can use HRSA NBHPP
preparedness dollars for stockpiling some
additional antibiotics, in addition to antivi-
rals, specifically Tamiflu for the treatment
of patients with influenza who present
within the first 48 hours of symptoms. It is
not recommended to stockpile for the pur-
pose of prophylaxis. Lastly, since there is
the possibility that a pandemic will not
affect all areas at once, it may be possible
to shift some resources between areas of
the state and region (HRSA Region 1
includes all the New England states, but
for the purposes of our current regional
planning efforts, it also includes NewYork
State).
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
PRIORITIES
There are many significant education
and training priorities in regard to pan-
demic influenza planning. First of all, the
value of annual vaccination for influenza
should be highlighted. Hospital personnel
with patient contact should be strongly
encouraged to receive the available
influenza vaccine, as it will not only pro-
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potentially could provide some degree of
protection against a mutation of a human
influenza virus. Educating health care
workers on diagnosis and management of
influenza in an interpandemic period,
along with basic infection control prac-
tices, should be practiced consistently and
then monitored to promote and reinforce
good behaviors. All institutions should
consider utilizing the training materials
already developed by CDC to provide
training programs for non-clinical health
care workers (i.e., director of nursing who
is still a licensed clinician but no longer
functions in a clinical capacity) to prepare
them for clinical roles mentioned earlier
under the Strategies for Staffing
Shortages. This training program should
be implemented when a pandemic appears
imminent. Hospitals and CHCs must
remember, however, that a key component
to this training is the conducting of table-
top or full-scale exercises that allow peo-
ple to practice their proposed roles in a
pandemic response.
EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION
STRATEGIES FOR STAFF AND THE
PUBLIC
It is essential for each hospital and
CHC to communicate honestly and openly
with its staff regarding pandemic influen-
za and the plan the facility has in place or
is working on to deal with a pandemic,
should it ever come. Health care organiza-
tions should communicate directly not
only with their staff, but with the popula-
tion they primarily serve. There are four
main messages they need to communicate
over and over: (1) Approaches to prevent
becoming infected; (2) When is it actually
necessary to come to the facility for care
related to influenza; (3) Appropriate sites
for outpatient triage and care; and (4)
Options for self-care.Another very impor-
tant message to get out to the public is that
they are still there to provide the cardiac
and cancer patients the care they need.
Public perception of our planning activi-
ties has been plagued historically by insuf-
ficient communication strategies and a rel-
ative dearth of timely data. In order to
avoid massive panic, it is necessary to pro-
mote public acceptance wherever and
whenever possible, and well in advance of
the crisis.
CONCLUSION
While the infrastructure of the state’s
health care system has improved signifi-
cantly as a result of the federal prepared-
ness funding received since 2002, there is
still work to be done, particularly in the
area of planning for an influenza pandem-
ic. With a practical, no-nonsense
approach, and maximization of the current
dollars being provided, the health care
facilities and DPH will work together to
make Connecticut’s health care system as
ready and as able as it can be when the
next pandemic arrives.
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